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Possibly the interpretation of the lexical items "if" and "only" is the subject disputed 
most in the largest number of language oriented disciplines, such as logic, natural 
language semantics, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. In this paper 
I want to focus on the logical and linguistic aspects of these items. I do not aim 
to present a brand new theory about or new insights on the two subjects. My aim, 
rather, is to try and improve upon existing analyses and where possible help with 
integrating them. 
Some standard formal and logical analyses of "if" and "only" are very attrac­
tive from a theoretical point of view, but their compatibility with more empirically 
oriented findings about the use of "if" and "only" in natural language can be ques­
tioned. With this paper I want to support the view that no such incompatibilities 
exist, that we witness two ways of approaching the same phenomenon, and that the 
findings in one perspective may contribute to those obtained in the other. 
As a starting point I take a system of dynamic semantics, actually my mother 
tongue, formally speaking. I will point out that a rigid dynamic semantic concep­
tion of meaning as such stands in the way of a more general, flexible, notion of 
interpretation, including that of if-clauses (section 1). I will next study a more 
empirically motivated interpretation of if -clauses as domain restrictors and argue 
that this alternative interpretation does not really pay off (section 2). In section 3 I 
sketch an analysis of ordinary, inverse, and only if -donkey sentences on the basis of 
(i) a classical notion of implication, (ii) a dynamic semantic notion of information, 
and (iii) an independently needed notion of information structure.  In section 4 these 
more or less theoretical observations are tested on a number of only if-donkey sen­
tences which I collected on the internet. My basic intuitions seem to be supported 
by this little corpus, although they are not sufficient to account for all of the data. 
Section 5 gives a glimpse into the reasons why I think the basic interpretation of 
"if" and "only" should not be taken to account for these additional data-mainly 
because these can be attributed to (the interplay with) other modal and pragmatic 
aspects of the conditionals at issue. 
1. Dynamic Semantics (Second Generation) 
One of the major achievements of the dynamic semantic paradigm is its uniform 
semantic account of anaphoric relationships across conjunctions and implications. 
Let us focus in on a dynamic semantics like that of dynamic predicate logic (Groe­
nendijk and Stokhof 1991, DPL), by and large inspired by discourse representa­
tion theory (Kamp 1984; Kamp and Reyle 1993 DRT) and file change semantics 
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(Heim 1982 FCS). The characteristic (distinctive) feature of DPL is that it renders 
(1 ,  'Egli's theorem') semantically valid: 
(1) (3x¢ 1\ 1jJ(x) ) {:} 3x(¢ 1\ 1jJ(x) ) 
By means of the supporting dynamic semantics, a formal and systematic analysis 
has thus been provided of a couple of sentences that have troubled semantic theory 
for ages. The equivalence in (1) reflects the intuitive, truth-conditional, equivalence 
of the following two examples: 
(2) A man is walking in the park. He is whistling. 
(3) A man who is walking in the park is whistling. 
The core (dynamic semantic) idea behind the equivalence in (1) has always been 
that (i) meaning is some kind of update potential and (ii) indefinites 'introduce' 
some kind of discourse referents, which are available for being picked up by subse­
quent anaphoric pronouns. 
Quite an appealing feature of DPL (and of DRT and FCS, if you want) is that 
it renders (4) valid, as a mere consequence of (1): 
(4) (3x¢ ---1- 1jJ(x) ) {:} -,(3x¢ 1\ -,1jJ(x) ) {:}(I) 
-,3x(¢ 1\ -,1jJ (x) ) {:} Vx(¢ ---1- 1jJ(x) ) 
Thus, DPL (like related systems) is able to deal, successfully, with Geach's noto­
rious donkey-sentence (5) which has standardly been taking to involve universal 
quantification over farmer-donkey pairs: 
(5) If a farmer owns a donkey (s)he beats it. 
Every farmer beats every donkey he or she owns. 
Example (5) has it that if you are presented with a (any) farmer who owns a (any) 
donkey, you will find that the first beats the latter. 
From a formal point of view DPL is very well behaved: its semantics is elegant 
and transparent, and it comes with a nice deduction system (Veltman 2001,  cf. , 
also, van Eijck 2001). However, as a model for the interpretation of anaphoric rela­
tionships in natural language it is rather limited and, worse, too rigid to be suitably 
extended. The reason is that a notion of update is hardwired into the system's notion 
of conjunction (and that of implication) and that anaphoric pronouns are associated 
with possible referents which can not but have the properties attributed to their an­
tecedents.1 This is problematic, as can be seen from Strawson's famous example of 
pronominal contradiction: 
(6) A: A man just fell of the cliff. 
(7) B: He didn't fall, he was pushed. 
In this example person B denies the referent to have the property previously ascribed 
to him by A. Besides, B even might continue with: 
(8) B: Besides, it was a �oman. 
In defense of an update (or E-type) approach one might claim that Strawson's ex­
ample is a special case, involving an intended referent which is (or, rather: was) 
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demonstratively present. As argued elsewhere (e .g., Dekker 2001) we do not think 
demonstrative presence is a prerequisite for cross speaker anaphora such as we 
might witness here, and, besides, it may be fairly obvious that someone who over­
hears Strawson's protagonists may very well understand what they claim without 
having access to the individual A and B intended to refer to (and which may even 
be the product of their imagination). 
Rigid update systems of interpretation are also deemed to fail in response to 
minor variants of (5) such as: 
(9) A farmer may beat a donkey if (s)he owns it. 
(10) Only if a farmer owns a donkey may (s)he beat it. 
In example (9) the clause "a farmer beats a donkey" is semantically (conditionally) 
dependent on the phrase "he owns it", whereas the latter is structurally (anaphori­
cally) dependent on the first. In a one-dimensional update system of interpretation 
this constitutes a paradox of interpretation. Essentially the same goes for example 
(10). The only if clause describes a necessary condition for a situation as described 
by the main clause to obtain. But what would such a situation be, according to the 
update analysis of pronouns? That (s)he, a farmer who owns a donkey, may beat it, 
the donkey (s)he owns? But if this is indeed the situation at issue, (10) would be 
vacuously true-which, as a matter of fact, the sentence is not.2 
The need for a potentially more flexible treatment of anaphoric relationships has 
given rise to what may be termed 'second generation' systems of dynamic seman­
tics. These systems crucially employ the notion of information developed in the 
first generation (Heimian information sets, say, the semantic correlate of discourse 
representation structures). The crucial difference with the first generation is that 
sentence meanings are not taken to be updates of these information sets, but infor­
mation sets themselves. By means of a dynamic notion of conjunction, which is 
derived from a classical notion of conjunction as intersection, anaphoric relation­
ships between indefinites and anaphoric pronouns can be established in a flexible 
way. 
The system underlying the remainder of this paper is such a system 'predicate 
logic with dynamic conjunction' (PLDC, Dekker 2000V This system is by and 
large inspired by (Stalnaker 1978; Stalnaker 1998) and close in basic spirit to that 
of (Zeevat 1989; van der Does 1996; van Rooy 1997). 
Passing over all technical details, Egli 's theorem (1) is also valid in PLA, as 
is the donkey equivalence (4). However, since the dynamics resides in a specific 
form of conjunction, and since it is not inherently encoded in the meanings of the 
sentences themselves, it is easy to come up with other forms of merging information 
sets. In particular, the information sets associated with Strawson's examples (6) and 
(7) can be construed as being (intended to be) about one individual, without this 
requiring us to merge their contents. 
The nice thing about a system like PLDC then is, that, on the one hand, it is 
more flexible in easily allowing other forms of merging information, whereas, on 
the other hand, it comprises DPL as a special case. This indeed implies that the nice 
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logical properties of DPL can be preserved, be it that they are qualified as logical 
properties in a restricted domain of application: that of monologue, or indeed of 
dialogue without conflict and revision. 
Having given a very rough sketch of the basic machinery, let us tum back to "if" and 
"only". In this paper we will assume basic interpretations of "if" and "only" in the 
spirit of Philo, Frege, Quine and Geach (but also Peirce and Grice) on the one hand, 
and a variety of authors like Horn, Rooth, de Mey and Hendriks, (among many 
many others) on the other. The basic idea is to associate "if" with � (and, more 
generally, with �), and "only" with 2 (and, in specific cases, with +-).4 Simple 
motivating examples are the following: 
(11)  Who qualify? 
• PostDocs do. (P � Q) 
• Only PostDocs do. (P 2 Q) 
(12) Will Francis get the job? 
• If he satisfies the prerequisites. (p � q) 
• Only if he satisfies the prerequisites. (p +- q) 
A more general interpretation is required in the following setting: 
(13) When does a student qualify? 
• If (s)he satisfies the prerequisites. (p � q) 
• Only if (s)he satisfies the prerequisites. (p 2 q) 
Before we take a further look at the inverse and only if donkey sentences (9) and 
(10), let us first consider an alternative idea about the meaning of if-clauses, which 
has gained some popularity in the literature. 
2. If-Clauses as Domain Restrictors? 
Quite a few authors have observed that if -clauses also figure as ' domain restrictors ' 
(Lewis 1975; Heim 1982; Kratzer 1991 ;  von Fintel 1998), and it has even been 
argued that domain restriction is their pivotal role, cf. , e.g. : 
"The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake. There is 
no two-place if . .  then connective in natural language. If-clauses are devices 
for restricting the domains of various operators." (Kratzer 1991, p. 656) 
Such a conclusion is by and large motivated by sentences with adverbial quantifiers, 
in which the if -clause indeed provides the restriction of an adverbial quantifier, and 
in the which main clause figures as its nuclear scope : 
(14) If a friend has problems Joe sometimes/usually/always/never helps him out. 
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Intuitively these examples seem to express that Joe helps in {some / most / all / no} 
cases in which a friend has problems. 
It has also been argued that if -clauses may serve to impose further constraints on 
the restriction of adnominal quantifiers. Consider the following two examples due 
to (Higginbotham 1986)5 : 
(15) Every student will succeed if he works hard. 
(16) No student will succeed if he goofs off. 
Example (15) can be given an intuitively correct interpretation, if it is taken to 
state that for every student the following holds: if he works hard he will succeed. 
However, a similar analysis of example (16) would give rather disastrous results. 
For suppose example (16) is rendered as stating that for no student this holds: if 
he goofs off he will succeed. If we read the latter implication as a material one, 
then the sentence would turn out to state that every student goofs off and no student 
succeeds, which is way too strong. Alternatively, if the sentence is taken to state that 
for no student there is a rule-governed connection between goofing off and success, 
then this is way too weak. Rather, example (16) seems to state that no student who 
goofs off will succeed, that is, that goofing off implies failure. 
Intuitively acceptable readings of both (15) and (16) can be obtained if the 
two if -clauses are interpreted as constraining the quantifier'S restriction. Example 
(15) says that every student who works hard succeeds and example (16) that no stu­
dents who goofs off succeeds. Something essentially similar holds of two examples 
which Kai von Fintel has attributed to Irene Heim: 
(17) Few people like New York if they didn't grow up there. 
(18) Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages. 
Intuitively, (17) states that few people who didn 't grow up in New York like New 
York, and example (18) can be taken to state that most letters which are shorter 
than five pages are answered. Finally, the following examples can be interpreted in 
a similar way: 
(19) Students qualify if they work hard. 
Example (19) intuitively says that hard working students qualify. The case for a 
domain restriction analysis of if thus appears to be rather strong. Indeed: 
"Thus there are good reasons to adopt the restrictor analysis for noun-phrase 
indicatives and not just for sentences involving adverbial quantifiers." (von 
Fintel l998, p. 212) 
The case is not that simple, though, as the following discussion may serve to show. 
First, consider some slight modifications of the students' success stories :  
(20) Derek succeeds if he works hard. 
There seems to be nothing to restrict in (20), and certainly it does not say that 
among those who work hard, Derek succeeds. Rather, the interpretation of (20) 
must involve some implication, that hard work will guarantee success for Derek. 
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(21) Only Derek succeeds if he works hard. 
(22) Only students succeed if they work hard. 
A domain restriction reading of (21 ,  if any) and (22) would entail that all who 
succeed work hard, whether they are students (or Derek) or not. Instead, on the 
wide scope only reading the sentences seem to state something different. 6 The 
sentences then can be taken to state that if someone succeeds who has worked hard, 
it is Derek, or a student,respectively. 
The domain restriction analysis goes even more drastically astray when we 
consider examples with indefinites and numeral determiners. 
(23) Some students succeed if they work hard. 
(24) Exactly three students succeed if they work hard. 
Clearly, (23) and (24) do not serve to state that some / exactly three students who 
work hard succeed. These sentences instead say something about the number of 
students for which hard work is a guarantee for success. An implication analysis 
of these sentences thus seems to be most appropriate, provided that the domain of 
quantification is restricted to those students for which (to the speaker's knowledge) 
working hard is still an option.7 
To conclude this negative part, let us finally point out another rather severe 
complication for a domain restriction analysis. Consider: 
(25) Every student accepts any position if (s)he qualifies for it. 
(26) No postdoc disregards a job opportunity if (s)he qualifies for it. 
If if -clauses constrain the domains of quantifiers, then they must be taken to con­
strain two domains simultaneously in (25) and (26). This is not impossible, but it 
certainly transcends the capacities of the envisaged techniques. Instead, it seems 
that for these examples, as for the examples (20-24), some implication analysis of 
a main-clause if-subordinate clause structure is appropriate. But then, again, what 
about (15-19)? Actually, an implication analysis of these sentences does not fare 
that bad at all. 
First observe that an analysis of if A as )..q p ---+ q is appropriate for (15) (and 25) 
and (19). For if any hard working student qualifies, then, and only then, it is true 
for any student that (s)he qualifies if (s)he works hard. Schematically: 
(27) (S n W H) � Q iff S � (W H U Q) 
With respect to the examples (16), and (17) (and 22) observe that the respective 
verb phrases figure in a downward entailing context. In (Dekker 1993; Dekker 
1999, Ch. 3) I have argued that external modification of material in a downward 
entailing context is subject to a dualization operator * , which guarantees preser­
vation of monotonicity properties. Such a logical operator turns a conditionalizer 
)..q p ---+ q into a conjoiner )..q p 1\ q: 
(28) ()..q p --+ q)* = )..q -, (p ---+ -,q) = )..q P 1\ q 
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If used in the interpretation of example (16) the example will be read as stating that 
no student (will) goof off and succeed, (17) as stating that few people didn't grow 
up in New York and like the city, and (22) as stating that only students both work 
hard and succeed. Surely, there are some modal and aspectual properties which 
are thus not accounted for (and which we will come back to below), but truth­
conditionally these paraphrases are equivalent with those obtained on the domain 
restriction reading. 
This leaves us with example (18): 
(18) Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages. 
Also for this example an implicative reading is certainly not inappropriate. Example 
(18) can be taken to say that most letters are subject to the rule or principle that if 
a letter is shorter than 5 pages, then it gets answered. 8 This reading is slightly 
different from the one in which the if-clause figures as a domain restrictor. For 
instance, suppose 5 letters are still under consideration, 3 are shorter than 5 pages 
and one of the three is answered. In that case 3 out of 5 letters (the answered letter 
and the 2 longer ones) obey the principle so the sentence would be true under the 
implicative reading. In the same case only 1 out of 3 letters which are shorter than 
5 pages are answered so the sentence would be false under the restrictive reading. I 
leave it to the general public to judge the issue. 
So far we have argued that indeed there is nothing obviously wrong with an im­
plicative interpretation of if -clauses, and that a domain restrictive reading is not 
generally tenable. If -clauses do not restrict adnominal quantifiers. But what about 
the adverbial quantifiers, which made up the clearest motivation for domain re­
striction analyses? Here we have to point out that, if, indeed, if-clauses impose 
conditions on the domains of quantification of adverbial quantifiers, this does *not* 
mean they are not >..q p ----+ q, basically. Suppose p is an (intentionally closed) propo­
sition, a condition on worlds, situations, assignments, sequences of individuals, or 
what have you. Suppose, moreover, we analyze an if A-clause as A)..q (Vp ----+ Vq) , 
abbreviated as R. The condition p then can be retrieved from R in the following 
way: 
(29) E(R) =df A\;fq(V R(q) ----+ vq) 
With R as specified, this gives us A\;fq( (Vp ----+ vq) ----+ Vq) {::} A\;fq(Vp V Vq) . Indeed, 
the worlds (situations, . . .  ) in which p is true in disjunction with any proposition, 
including a false one, is precisely the set of worlds (situations, . . .  ) in which p is 
true.9 As this result is perfectly general, we think we can be satisfied here with 
not choosing between analyzing if -clauses as restrictive or as implicative.10 Notice, 
again, that, since we can retrieve p from >..q p ----+ q, the meaning of only ifp (>..q P f-­
q) can be defined as a function on the meaning of ifp. 
To conclude this section, let us sum up the results. We have argued that if-clauses 
do not generally restrict adnominal quantifiers, that they may restrict that of adver­
bial (or adsentential) quantifiers, but that they can do so also on their >..q p ----+ q 
interpretation. Finally, we have observed some presuppositional restrictions upon 
domains of quantification, which will be taken more serious in the next section. 
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3. Inverse and Only If Donkey Sentences 
Let us now turn back to inverse and only if-donkey sentences. In (von Finte1 1994) it 
has already been observed that phonological structure (with associated information 
structure) is highly relevant for the interpretation of inverse and only if -donkey 
sentences. Consider: 
(30) A farmer may [beat]F a donkey if (s)he owns it. 
(31) Only if a farmer [owns]F a donkey may (s)he beat it. 
These examples seem to be fine. They appear to be about farmers and donkeys, and 
either the question when a farmer is allowed to beat a donkey, or the question what a 
farmer may do to a donkey he owns. Of all pairs of a farmer and a donkey (30) says 
that if it is an own-pair, it is also a may-beat-pair, and (31) that only if it is an own­
pair it is a may-beat-pair. The farmers and donkeys, in other words, seem to have 
escaped the conditional structures, and to live in their domain of quantification. A 
proper interpretation of the pronouns thus seems to be possible precisely because 
they relate to an antecedent which, semantically, is not dependent on the clause 
which the pronoun figures in. The whole conditional structures, with the pronouns 
in them, are dependent on the domains of quantification evoked by "a farmer" and 
"a donkey" . 
Such an analysis can be motivated further by examples where some of the 
indefinites figure in a focalized constituent: 
(32) ? A farmer may [beat a donkeY]F if (s)he owns it. 
(33) ? Only if a farmer [owns a donkeY]F may (s )he beat it. 
These sentences are problematic, semantically speaking. They appear to be about 
farmers and to address the question when such a farmer is allowed to beat a donkey. 
But, if this is so, then it is unclear what the pronoun "it" stands for. It is clear that the 
pronoun "he" in these examples, as in the previous ones, stands for a, or any, farmer. 
But where "it" in the previous examples clearly refers to a or any donkey, it seems 
to be unresolved here. "Only if a farmer [owns a donkeY]F may he beat what?" 
seems to be a natural response to (33). Again, a reply with "a, or any, donkey he 
owns" would render the example trivial. The examples are odd, we claim, because 
the donkeys are focalized, and they are therefore unable to escape the conditional 
structure. Putting it the other way around, indefinites may escape certain semantic 
structures, and figure as antecedents of subsequent anaphoric pronouns only if they 
are non-focal (non-novel, or "topical" as we will also say). This observation is not 
at all new by the way (cf., e.g., Gawron 1996; Aloni et al. 1999; Krifka 2001), but 
(30-33) provide striking examples of the phenomenon. 
Before we turn to a (sketch of an) analysis, consider the two replies in exam­
ple (13) again. They could as well have been formulated as follows: 
(34) A student qualifies if (s)he satisfies the prerequisites. 
If a student satisfies the prerequisites (s )he qualifies. 
1 2 1  
1 22 Paul Dekker 
(35) A student qualifies only if (s)he satisfies the prerequisites. 
Only if a student satisfies the prerequisites (s)he qualifies. 
As a reply to the question in (13) it is clear that these statements are about the 
students and about the question whether or in which cases they qualify. Notice that 
it is immaterial whether the indefinite is in the main or in the subordinate clause 
in (34) and (35). Thus, the semantic contribution of these topical phrases indeed 
seems to escape from the structures in which they figure. 
Let us finally point at a parallel mechanism which can be seen to be at work 
in the following examples, the first attributed to Marco Bikker by Helen de Hoop, 
the second from Regine Eckardt: 
(36) Most boys were rejected because of their height. 
(37) Almost all tickets were sold at checker 4. 
(38) Only boys who were rejected because of their height may file a complaint. 
Example (36) can be taken to quantify over the boys who were rejected. Similarly, 
(37) can be understood as an assertion about the tickets which were sold, and (38) 
as an assertion about boys who were rejected (and who may file a complaint). As in 
the previous examples, non-focal material figuring at one place in the structures-in 
the verb phrase in (36-37) and in a restrictive relative clause in (38}-escapes from 
there and somehow projects itself into a domain of quantification. In the remainder 
of this section we will see how this behavior can be modeled in a straightforward 
way using techniques dealing with presupposition and information structure famil­
iar from the literature. 
In line with most, if not all, theories of presupposition and information struc­
ture we assume that information conveyed by means of natural language can be 
divided into a presupposition or ground part, and an assertion or focal part. More 
specifically, we will assume some compositional method of building such structured 
pieces of information in the style of (Karttunen and Peters 1 979), using Heimian in­
formation sets to model first order information.ll 
In all of the examples which we have discussed in this section, presuppositional­
like material restricts a domain of quantification. In principle, this type of domain 
restriction can be effectuated in two ways. Presuppositions may impose additional 
constraints on the explicitly specified restrictions of quantifiers, as on the domain 
restriction analysis of if -clauses, or as constraining the contextually given domain 
of quantification (ct. , Westerstahl 1984)P It seems the latter option has to be pre­
ferred, intuitively, but, arguably, also empirically. 
First observe that contextually restricted domains of quantification should be 
kept distinct from the first argument of a non-conservative term like only (exam­
ples like these are discussed by (Jager 1996), and by Herman Hendriks, in many 
presentations): 
(39) Which Athenians are wise? 
(40) Only sophists are wise. (OA (S) (W) {:} (A n S) 2 (A n W)) 
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As a reply to (39), (40) can be used to state, not that all wise men are Athenian 
sophists, but, rather, that only (Athenian) sophists are wise Athenians. Similarly, 
example (38) has a reading which entails nothing about girls or about boys who 
were not rejected. This reading can be obtained if the non-focal condition of being 
a boy who is rejected is projected, from the restriction of only into the domain of 
quantification. We take it then, that such presuppositions, thus, restrict the domain 
of quantification and do not constrain the restriction of the determiner. 
Let us now try and see how the Bikker - de Hoop - Eckardt type of examples 
can be handled. Presuppositional restriction of domains of quantification can be 
represented, roughly, as: 
(41) GQc(A) ( (B ;  D) ) {:} GQc( (B ;  A) ) (D) {:} GQcnB (A) (D) 
Backgrounded material B in the nuclear scope or in the restriction of a quantifier 
GQ can simply be used to constrain the (possibly presupposed) domain of quantifi­
cation C. For (37) and (38) this gives us the intended readings: 
(37) Almost all tickets were sold at checker 4. 
AAc(T) ( (8; 8AT4) )  {:} AAcns (T) (8AT4) 
(38) Only boys who were rejected because of their height may file a complaint. 
Oc( (B n R; RBOTH) )  (MFC) {:} OcnBnR(B n RBOTH) (MFC) 
Example (37) is evaluated against a background domain of quantification consisting 
of the tickets which were sold (in the present context C). Example (38) relates to 
the boys (in the context) who were rejected, and it is taken to state that only those 
among them who were rejected because of their height may file a complaint. 
Essentially the same techniques can be used to model what is going on in in­
verse and only if -donkey sentences, now we have the means to deal with anaphoric 
relationships in a sophisticated way. In the following examples it is important to re­
alize that context sets, like information sets, may contain information about tuples 
of individuals: 
(30) A farmer may [beat]F a donkey if (s)he owns it. 
IIc ( (3x (F(x) /\ 3yD(y) ; MB(x) (y) ) ) (O (x) (y) ) {:} 
V(x, y)c ( (F(x) /\ D(y) ) -t (ll/I B (x) (y) � O (x) (y) ) )  
Example (30) i s  true iff for all pairs of farmers x and donkeys y in the context this 
holds: x may beat y if x owns y. 
(31) Only if a farmer [owns]F a donkey may (s)he beat it. 
OIc ( (3x (F(x) /\ 3yD(y) ; O (x) (y) ) ) (MB(x) (y) ) {:} 
V(x, y)c ( (F(x) /\ D(y) ) -t (O(x) (y) � MB(x) (y) ) )  
Example (31) i s  true iff for all of the same type of pairs: only if x owns y, x may 
beat y. Interestingly, the very same type of analysis seems to be fit for ordinary 
donkey-sentences :  
(5) If a farmer [owns]F a donkey (s  )he beats it. 
Ic( (3x(F(x) /\ 3yD(y) ; O (x) (y) ) ) (B(x) (y) )  {:} 
V(x,  y)c ( (F(x) /\ D (y) ) -t (O (x) (y) -+ B(x) (y) ) ) 
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Such a donkey sentence is rendered true iff for all of the same type of pairs above : 
if x owns y then x beats y. This is interesting, because it shows we get a strong 
reading of donkey sentences, not just from a dynamic semantic interpretation of 
---* , but from a basically classical interpretation of ---* and independently motivated 
principles of interpreting information (anaphoric) structure .  In short, all key exam­
ples motivating a dynamic semantics can be handled using a static semantics, an 
independently motivated notion of information structure, a flexible combinatorics, 
and, not unimportantly, a dynamic semantic notion of information. 13 
In this section we have sketched an analysis of inverse and only if -donkey sentences 
in terms of their information structure, and based on the independently motivated 
idea that topical or non-focal material projects into domains of quantification. The 
analysis generalizes to ordinary donkey sentences and allows us to do without a 
dynamic or DRT -style analysis of ---* and stick to a classical one. 
4. Only if a Internet Search 
Some semantic/linguistic discussions tend to get so sophisticated that they reach 
a realm of subtle expert examples and intuitions which do not raise any sensible 
reaction (support, rejection) from ordinary language users. For this reason I have 
tried to lift our arm-chair philosophy to the level of mouse-arm linguistics. I was 
seriously interested in the question if only if-donkey sentences are actually used, 
and, besides, I must admit, it was easy enough to look for sentences like this with 
an ordinary search engine. I was pretty much surprised to find an interesting lot of 
these examples, and in this section I will comment upon them from the perspectives 
sketched in the previous sections. I hope it needs no comments that my findings in 
this section are statistically not at all significant. I have not collected a sufficiently 
significant corpus of examples, and my evaluation of each of the examples is not 
tested upon judgements of others. 
I did my search with the search engine Altavista, 2000 October 10, 1 1. 35, 
looking for + " Only i f  a " .  Altavista reported: 
(42) " 1 9 6 8  pages f ound " , " word c ount : Only if a :  3 2 0 "  
and presented me 200 hits. One third of these were misfires, so I ended up with 
a corpus of 133 examples . 14 Not all examples were really understandable as such, 
e.g. : 
(43) June 12, 2000 - What should Ollie do ? 
47% Yes, in every case 
48% No, never 
5% Only if a repeat offender [128] 
(1) Like I said, the humble question which I started out with was :  
• are only if-donkey sentences actually used? 
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and the answer is unconditionally positive. In more than half of the examples an 
indefinite in the if -clause is anaphorically related to material in the main clause, 
directly (as in (44» or more indirectly (as in (45» : 
(44) Only if a greenish beryl is found without either a yellow or blue tone will it 
be called a "green " beryl. [6] 
(45) Only if a project takes an extremely excessive amount of time and work will 
the fee be any more than that. [1 ]  
(2) In almost all of these examples the indefinite(s) can be seen to restrict the do­
main of quantification. Sometimes the indefinites are partly topical (as in (46» or 
functional upon the things that actually are quantified over (as in (47» : 
(46) Only if a "plain vanilla " /SO-9660 CD were being burned would these mes­
sages be of any interest, and such a CD would be useless for Linux installa­
tion anyway. [47] 
(47) Only if a second smoke detector trip occurs within a short time, typically 60 
seconds, or if the detector fails to reset, an alarm is activated [34] 
Only seven examples are, arguably, one-case only if -conditionals, such as (48): 
(48) Only if a miracle takes place will the far reaching goals it set at the start of 
the decade be reached. [18] 
(3) Generally only if-clauses express necessary conditions for the condition in the 
main clause. There is only one obvious exception in our corpus: 
(49) Only if a trick contains no trump, it is won by the highest card of the suit led 
to it. [17] 
Strictly speaking example (49) is false. However, the context in which (49) occurs 
might speak in its favour. IS 
(4) According to the analysis sketched above an indefinite in an only if-clause must 
be non-focal (topical, non-novel) in order to allow an anaphoric element in the main 
clause to pick up its possible values. The indefinite must contribute to the domain 
of quantification. This prediction is by and large confirmed. 16 
(5) Upon our analysis it ought to be possible to reformulate only if A B-sentences 
systematically as B, only if A.  Indeed this turns out to be generally possible. The 
possibility to swap the two clauses is only blocked, systematically, if the A-clause 
contains an indefinite and the B-clause a related pronoun or anaphoric definite. 
Anaphoric relationships can thus be seen to systematically require an ante-cedent, 
and not to be satisfied with a post-cedent. For, indeed, if we swap the only if A­
and the B-clause in these sentences, and at the same time exchange antecedents and 
anaphors, the results tum out fine again. Try for yourself, for instance, with the 
following examples: 
(50) Only if a student changes residence to living at home or vice versa will the 
student need to contact the FinancialAid Office. [12] 
(51) Only if a child fells right can he think right [27] 
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(52) Only if a judge were actually biased should her decision be reversed. [80] 
The fact that indefinites (deemed topical) can be so easily moved from the subordi­
nate clause to the main clause may serve as a further indication that their semantic 
contribution is not local, and that, as we claim, it is projected into the domain of 
quantification. 17 
(6) In line with observations in (Geis 1973; McCawley 1 981; Horn 1996, among 
others), a sentence Only if A B must be (up to) equivalent with a contraposed sen­
tence If not A not B. The examples in our corpus support this thesis, but with one 
systematic qualification. Indefinites in the subordinate only if A -clause which are 
deemed topical naturally escape the negation in the ifnotA-clause. Try for yourself, 
with, e.g. : 
(53) Only if a student's behavior is disruptive or coercive should it be prohibited. 
[21 ]  
(54) Only if a us. exporter sells to the Nigerian government through an agent is 
there a registration fee requirement. [66] 
Non-topical indefinites, however, do not do so: 
(55) Only if a common framework is created, can innovative tax concepts be 
successful. [93] 
(56) Only if a king's son would agree to marry me as a frog could the spell be 
broken. [105] 
These observations thus give further support for the thesis that the semantic contri­
bution of topical indefinites is not local.18 
(7) Just for the record we mention that our corpus contains seven examples with a 
conjunctive if-clause such as (57), and four with a disjunctive one (like (47) above). 
(57) Only if a student has participated and turned in work for more than half of 
the class will an "I" be given. [53] 
All of these example seem to behave as can be expected. That is, they all seem to 
validate the following Boolean scheme: 
(58) Only if A and/or A' B {::} If not A or/and not A', not B 
But even though they are generally well-behaved, it can be difficult to choose the 
right Boolean-as can be seen from the con-disjunction: 
(59) Only if a couple posted bond, obtained a license, and or presented a certifi-
cate to the county official would their marriage be recorded. [22] 
Resuming our results so far we find that (i) only if-clauses indeed appear to state 
necessary conditions for possible states or events reported in the main clauses; (ii) 
topical (or non-novel) indefinites in these clauses project their semantic contribu­
tion into the relevant domains of quantification; and (iii) pronouns in these struc­
tures may be anaphoric upon antecedent indefinites in them if, and only if, these 
indefinites are topical. Up to this point (our interpretation of) the examples in our 
corpus support the views we have exposed above. 
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S. Causal and Other Dependencies 
Upon our basic analysis, "if" and "only if" are each other's (logical) converses, and 
they report regularities at best, no dependencies, and they are therefore deemed to 
be each other's converses. However, it has often been observed that conditionals 
are used to express dependencies between eventualities reported in main and sub­
ordinate clauses, and that this hampers a reformulation of only if A B into A if B, 
and vice versa. Indeed "if" and "only if" are not at all ideal converses in natural 
language. A stunning counterexample comes from (McCawley 1974; McCawley 
1981): 
(60) If butter is heated, it melts. 
(61) *Butter is heated, only if it melts. 
Whereas (60) seems a perfectly natural thing to say, and to be true, probably, its 
converse (61) sounds very odd, if indeed understandable at all. 
The same holds for the majority of examples in our little corpus. Only if A B 
and A if B do not seem to express exactly the same states of affairs, except in only 
a few cases: 
(62) Only if a unit is flawless is it ready for shipping. [59] 
(63) Only if a file is available at both sites the mirror sites are listed. [91] 
(64) Only if a great saint occurs, do we permit [a relaxation} on his memorial 
[129] 
(Note: the pronoun "his" in (64) is not anaphoric upon "a great saint".) 
There are a few points to be made here. First, the observations about Mc­
Cawley's (60-61) can be explained by a principle stated in (Talmy 1978; Reinhart 
1984) according to which causal consequences of events reported in a main clause 
are not allowed to figure in subordinate clauses.19 A consequential interpretation of 
(60) is thus blocked in (61). Instead, (61) can be taken to suggest that, for butter, 
melting is a necessary condition for being heated, which, indeed, is an odd thing to 
state.20 
Second, the Talmy/Reinhart's principle only serves as an explanation of the 
non-convertibility of Only if A B into A if B if these sentences report a 'deeper' 
connection between the material described in the main and the subordinate clauses 
than just a regularity or corelation. This point can be strengthened with an example 
from (von Fintel 1997). A reformulation of only if with if is possible if must is 
added (and will is dropped) : 
(65) We will celebrate only if John wins. 
(66) ?If we will celebrate, John wins the race. 
(67) If we celebrate, then John must have won the race. 
According to (65) John's success is a prerequisite for a celebration, and this de­
pendency blocks a reformulation into (66)-which even suggests that a possible 
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celebration would speed up John sufficiently. But such a consequential relation can 
be canceled by adding an epistemic must, indicating that a possible celebration (as 
referred to with 67) constitutes sufficient evidence for conclusions about the out­
comes of the race. Notice, however, that there is a subtle difference between (65) 
and (67). Whereas the first indeed seems to state a genuine dependency between 
possible events described by the main and the subordinate clause (a prerequisite, for 
instance), the second at best states a consequence from the dependency reported by 
the first, and not a dependency itself. A completely similar pattern can be observed 
with quite a few examples in our corpus, as you may try for yourself on: 
(68) Only if a youngster is playing along with senior cricketers, he will develop 
in confidence and do well. [1 14] 
(69) Only if a system also talks his language, a user will be convinced by machine-
found proofs and feel his understanding of the topic improved. [123] 
A major question at this point then is the following. If (only) if -sentences are used 
to report something over and above mere regularities, is this a uniform feature, and 
should it be taken to belong to the meaning of "(only) if"? Unfortunately, there 
is no room here to really go into this question, but we will not withhold from the 
reader the impression we have got from the examples in our corpus. These are, 
first, that there is a great variety of modals21 in the main clauses of our examples, 
and that these contribute to the expression of a great variety of dependencies. Many 
examples are concerned with regularities, necessities and possibilities of all kinds, 
personal, conventional, logical, moral, juridic, causal, . . . .  Quite a few others are 
concerned with permission, obligation, advice and instruction, including that of the 
workings of machines and politicians. And although quite a lot of this variety can 
be attributed to the fact that conditionals may relate to a variety of "modal bases" 
(Kratzer 1981), it does not seem that they use these modal bases in a uniform way. 
I am thus tempted to conclude, fully in the spirit of (Grice 1989), that there 
must be a uniform, basic meaning of "if" and "only", and that, as a matter of fact, 
this must be the weakest one, the one we have also employed in this paper. Ad­
ditional aspects of meaning should be explained as the result of a combination of 
factors:  on the one hand, the basic semantics of "only", "if" and of modal and 
temporal operators in the main clause of a conditional, and, on the other, relevant 
pragmatic features, such as information structure, implicit questions under discus­
sion, indexical features, besides general pragmatic principles and constraints like 
those of Talmy and Reinhart. 
Conclusion 
This paper started out with the observation that inverse and only if -donkey sen­
tences pose a problem for a classical dynamic semantic framework. We have 
sketched an account of these sentences in what we call a "second generation" frame­
work, which crucially employs the notion of information developed in the first, but 
with a more classical and more flexible combinatorics. 
ON IF AND ONLY 
The main idea has been that donkey indefinites in inverse ,  only if and ordi­
nary donkey sentences are topical and are projected into the domains of quantifi­
cation of (im- or explicit) adverbial or adsentential quantifiers. The effects of this 
have been modeled on the basis of a classical analysis of "if" and "only" and a 
Karttunen and Peters-style treatment of information structure. 
In passing we have argued that domain restriction effects of if -clauses are 
real, that these effects can, but need not, be attributed to the semantic contribution 
of if, and that if-clauses do not restrict nominal quantifiers (although their presup­
positions may do so). 
We have next tested our findings on a corpus of only if -donkey sentences 
drawn from the internet. Our intuitions about these examples indeed constitute 
motivation for the idea that topical indefinites do not semantically contribute to 
their local context, and that only these can be antecedents for anaphoric pronouns. 
We also find strong motivation for the idea that if- and only if -sentences 
report something over and above the statement of a mere regularity, but we have not 
found sufficient reason to attribute this additional aspect of meaning to the meaning 
of "if" and "only". (Of course, not being able to find such a reason may be a 
shortcoming of the author.) 
Just to conclude, let me repeat that our little corpus can be inspected at: 
• http : / /www . wins . uva . nl / - pdekker/ SALT/ 
There you can also find some of the minimal context of our final number of the 
show: 
(70) Only if a building is selected, and a name is picked randomly from a list of 
the persons in that building, can we use the fact that the name denotes a 
person on the 2nd floor to infer that the probability that it is a 100-persons 
house is less than 75%. (In fact, it's 8%.) [13] 
Endnotes 
IThis is also a characteristic feature of an E-type interpretation of pronouns. 
2Notice that an E-type pronoun approach faces essentially the same problem. 
3For the purposes of exposition it is the most transparent one to use here. When it actually 
comes to the study and motivation of the underlying semantics, we however prefer the 
system called 'predicate logic with anaphora' (PLA). For a technical introduction to that 
system, cf., (Dekker 2001); for more philosophical motivation, cf., (Dekker 200xb). The 
central ideas and properties of the systems PLDC and PLA are by and large the same. 
4Notice that these four connectives are interdefinable, for, e.g., ;;2 = ()..P)..Q Q � P) , 
--+ = ()..p)..q ()..x p) � ()..x q) ) ,  � = ()..P)..QVx(Q(x) f- P(x) ) ) ,  etc. 
5Examples such as these are also discussed in (Bosch 1983). 
6If the if-clause of (21) is given wide scope, it says that if Derek works hard, then only he 
will succeed. So it is part of his unchummy ambitions then to become the one and only who 
succeeds. 
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7 As (von Finte1 1998) observes, example (23) indeed corresponds to the examples figuring 
in what has been called "Peirce's puzzle". But sure enough, Peirce 's puzzle is definitely not 
solved by a domain restriction analysis of if-clauses, but by a combined semantic pragmatic 
(Gricean) analysis of utterances of conditionals, completely similar to the one offered by 
Peirce himself. (See Dekker 200xa for discussion). 
8 As before, the suggested connection between main and subordinate clause seems to be 
stronger than the one given by a material implication analysis, but this is something which 
can be accounted for in pragmatic terms, as (Grice 1989) has already argued for. An essen­
tially similar account can be given of the fact that quantification in (18) seem to be restricted 
to a domain of letters which are still under consideration for being answered. 
9Notice that we could have done the same without the I\ 's and v 's, but the present formula­
tion may be more insightful. 
lOIf if-clauses are analyzed as (incomplete) conditionals, there is indeed an arrow ---+ present 
in the interpretation of the full sentences, contrary to the conclusion of (Kratzer 1991) 
quoted above. However, the point, entirely consistent with her conclusion, is that ---+ doesn't  
really act as a two-place operator then. For, pushing the point a bit, such sentences can be 
analyzed as O(p ---+) (q) , with 0 the main (explicit or implicit) sentential operator. The 
whole issue, thus, trivializes. 
11 What we here envisage is, arguably, *the* semantic correlate of the very well-behaved 
structural theory of (van der Sandt 1989; Geurts 1999). Indeed, using Heimian information 
sets, or discourse representation structures like Geurts and van der Sandt do, the so-called 
'binding problem' ,  which has been deemed so disastrous for Karttunen and Peters ' anal­
ysis, automatically disappears. As (Karttunen and Peters 1979) themselves observed their 
analysis has a problem with the following example: 
(71) Someone managed to succeed George V on the throne of England. 
Upon Karttunen and Peters ' analysis the person who is presupposed to have had difficulties 
with succeeding George V can be different from the one who is asserted to have done so 
eventually. But as soon as one can render the semantics of anaphoric relationships in order, 
this problem dissolves completely. For instance, example (71) can be said to presuppose 
that someone has tried hard to succeed George V, and to assert that that person eventually 
did succeed him. 
12If QD (A) (B) is a quantified construction evaluated relative to a domain D, and if C is 
a presupposition of A or B, then the whole can, in principle, be interpreted in one of two 
ways: as QD (C n A) (B) or as QDndA) (B) .  Distinguishing cases involve (readings ot) 
determiners which do not satisfy extension or conservativity. 
13We here have to add a note on so-called asymmetric quantification. If indefinites are 
non-topical, as in: 
(72) If a man [had a dime ]F,  he threw it in the parking meter. 
our analysis does not apply. However, there are independent reasons to assume that the 
pronoun "it" must act like some kind of an E-type pronoun in these contexts. Cf. (van Rooy 
1997) for relevant discussion. 
14 An overview of the examples, in context, and with address, can be found at 
• http : / /www . wins . uva . n l / - pdekker / SALT / 
References to the examples in that file are given here in square brackets : ' [nn] ' .  
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15There can be, and actually has been, discussion about the proper evaluation of example 
(49). 1 thank Ede Zimmermann for some pertinent comments. 
160nly in seven cases the indefinite does not itself restrict the domain of quantification, but 
in six of these cases the indefinite is partly topical or functional upon the material that is 
quantified over, as, e.g. , in (73): 
(73) Only if a land worthy of economic exploitation was found would it be colonized. 
[124]) 
Only (74) seems to present a real counterexample: 
(74) Only if a leader sees you he 'll ask you if your in a server he 's in. [49]) 
But then, indeed, it seems hard to make sense of this mysterious example. The context of 
(74) does not help. 
17Swapping the two clauses of only if-sentences with indefinites that are partly topical 
requires some more subtle adjustments. Example (73), for instance, would have to be re­
formulated as: 
(75) A land found would be colonized only if it was worthy of economic exploitation. 
18There are also some interesting interactions between modals in the main B-clause and the 
second negation in the contraposed reformulation. Unfortunately, there is no room to go 
into this issue here. 
191 am indebted to Antje RoBdeutscher for supplying me with the reference to Reinhart's 
work. Talmy states a principle like this as a possible universal of natural language. 
20There are more constructions which may occur happily in a main clause, but not in subor­
dinate clauses. Questions, demands, epistemic modals and probabilities can be condition­
alized, whereas they are not allowed to figure in if -clauses. Consider: 
(76) Do not invite the Smiths, if you don't like gossip. 
* Only if do not invite the Smiths, you don't like gossip. 
(77) If 1 agree, then what's in it for me? 
* 1  agree, only if what's in it for me? 
(78) If Mary is home, then maybe/probably Bill is around as well. 
*Mary is home, only if maybe/probably Bill is around (as well). 
21There are 28 examples which come without a modal or temporal operator, 34 with will, 
20 with would, 17 with can, 3 with could, 9 with should, and 22 with modalities stated 
otherwise. 
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